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High Court of Justice. Common Pleas Division.
ELPHICK v. BARNES.
The plaintiff sold a horse to the defendant upon condition that it should be tried
by him for eight days, and returned at the end of that time if the defendant did not
think it suitable for his purposes. The horse died in the defendant's stable within
the eight days, but without fault of either party. The plaintiff having brought an
action for the price of the horse as for goods sold and delivered. Held, that the
action was not maintainable.

THE material facts and the arguments sufficiently appear from
the judgment.
DENMAN, J.-The plaintiff in this case sued the defendant for
651., the price of a horse and a cow sold and delivered.
The defendant admitted that he agreed to purchase a horse and
a cow, but alleged that they were not sold or purchased together
at 651., but under two separate and distinct contracts. There was
conflicting evidence as to this part of the defence, but upon the
argument before me (there having been no finding of the jury
upon the point) it was agreed that I should decide the question,
and I found for the defendant that there were two separate and
distinct contracts, the horse being to be sold for 401. and the cow
for 251. The latter amount was paid into court, and no question
remains for decision except that arising upon the defendant's
answer to the plaintiff's demand so far as the price of the horse
was concerned. This answer, as set out in the statement of
defence, was as follows: "The price of the said horse was 401., and
the plaintiff warranted it sound and well, and it was sold to the
defendant on the terms that if it did not answer the said warranty or
suit the defendant, the defendant-should be at liberty to reject the
same. The said horse was neither sound nor well at the time of
the sale to the defendant, but was suffering from internal inflammation, and in consequence of such unsoundness and illness it
died before a reasonable time in which to return the same had
elapsed. The defendant, on discovery of the unsoundness, repudiated the contract, and gave notice thereof to the plaintiff."
The jury found that there was no warranty of soundness, and
that the horse was in fact sound at the time when the bargain
was made. But the defendant's 0ounsel at the trial relied, not
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only on a warranty, but upon evidence that the plaintiff, at the
time of the bargain being made, had agreed that the defendant
might take the horse away and work him, and if he did not suit
the defendant by working in every kind of vehicle for which the
defendant required him, the defendant might return him within
eight days. The bargain having taken place on Thursday, the
31st of July, the horse died on Sunday, the 3d of August, in the
defendant's stable, to which he had been removed on the 31st of
July. Under these circumstances the defendant's counsel contended that the defendant was not liable, because the bargain was
a conditional one, and, the sale not having become absolute before
the death of the horse, an action for goods sold and delivered
would not lie.
It was objected for the plaintiff that no such case ought to be
left to the jury, because it was not raised by the statement of
defence. But I was of opinion that this defence was one included
in the statement of defence, that the pleadings might properly be
amended if necessary, but that it was not necessary to amend them,
and that no injustice would be done by leaving the question to the
jury. I therefore left it to the jury as follows: "Was the bargain
on the 31st of July one for a sale out and out, or only for a sale
conditional on the defendant finding the horse all right at the end
of the eight days ?" The jury found in answer to that question
"that the bargain was conditional on the horse being right and
with a trial for eight days." Being doubtful what the jury meant
by "right," I asked them the question; to which they replied,
"Suitable for the defendant's purposes, not contemplating the case
of death." They afterwards added, in answer to a further question. "But for the complaint which came on after the bargain,
we see no reason to suppose that the horse would not have been
suitable for the defendant's purposes. By ' trial,' we mean a trial
as regards suitability, not as regards health." Taking all these
findings together, I think they amount to a finding that the plaintiff sold the horse to the defendant upon a condition that the horse
should be taken away by the defendant and tried by him for eight
days, and returned at the end of eight days if the defendant did
not think it suitable for his purposes. The horse having died
without fault of either party, the question is whether the plaintiff
can maintain his action for goods sold and delivered. I am of
opinion he cannot.
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The case of -Ellisv. Mortimer, 1 Bos. & P. N. R. 257, shows
that the defendant had the whole time allowed for the trial in
which to decide whether he would return the horse or not. I
think it clear that no action for goods sold and delivered would
have lain at any time before the eight days had expired, in case
the horse had lived. But before the eight days had expired the
horse died. If the defendant were to be fixed with the price of
the home, he would be compelled to pay for something different
from what he had bargained for, namely, a horse of which he
should have had eight days' trial. The finding that the horse
might, or probably would, have suited the defendant's purposes
does not appear to me to be sufficient reason for fixing the defendant as the absolute owner of the horse. The option was his at the
moment of the home's death, and down to a later period if the
horse had lived. The case of Bugg v. Minett, 11 East 210, which
was relied upon for the plaintiff, does not appear to me to apply,
because that was not a case in which the buyer of the goods which
were destroyed had any option as to whether he should become the
purchaser or not, but, at the time of the destruction of the goods, he
had, by virtue of the bargain and of what had passed, become the
absolute owner of the goods in respect of which he was held liable.
Nor, in my opinion, does the dictum of Mr. Justice COLERIDGE,
,in Moss v. Sweet, 16 Q. B. N. S. 495, which was relied upon for
the plaintiff, help the plaintiff's contention in this case. That was
a case in which, the defendant having taken delivery of goods "on
sale or return," and having kept the goods, it was held that the
sale was complete if the goods had not been returned within a
reasonable time, and that the common count for goods sold and
delivered would suffice. Mr. Justice COLERIDGE in that case says:
"The goods in question passed on condition that unless returnedthat is, at the option of the buyer within a reasonable time-they
were to be taken as sold to him. That condition was at an end
after the lapse of a reasonable time without a return of the goods,
and the sale was then complete." He does not say that it was
complete before that time. He does go on to say, "1The same consequence would follow where the goods are destroyed or injured,
so that a return within the meaning of the contract becomes impossible." This was relied upon as referring to an accidental destruction, such as by death or fire. I think it clear that this was not
the meaning, but that the learned judge referred to destruction of,
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or injury to, the goods, being the act of the defendant, in which
case, of course, the defendant would have been liable as much as
if he had kept them an unreasonable time.
The case of Head v. Tattersall, Law Rep., 7 Exch. 7, is
nearer to the present case. That was an action for money received,
to recover back the price of a horse which had been sold at Tattersall's, with a warranty and a condition that the plaintiff was to be
at liberty to return the horse, if it did not answer the description,
up to the following Wednesday. The horse was injured on its
way home, and depreciated in value, but without any fault of the
plaintiff's servant, who was taking it home. The horse, being
found not to correspond with the warranty, was returned within
the time, and it was held that the plaintiff had a right to return it
and recover back the price, notwithstanding that he was unable to
return it in the same condition. It was attempted to distinguish
that case from the present, on the ground that in that case there
was a right to return the horse on a specific ground on which it
was, in fact, returned. But I can see no difference in principle
between such a case and the case in which the purchaser has an
option to return the horse on any ground still remaining to him at
the time at which the event occurs which renders it impossible for
him to exercise that option and so to have the whole benefit of his
bargain. In such a case, I think the sale to him cannot be considered to be absolute at the time of the accident occurring. The
maxim of res perit domino applies, I think, in such a case, much
more reasonably as against the unpaid contingent vendor than as
against the possible vendee still having an option to return at the
end of a period not yet expired. I think the law relating to such
a case is accurately stated by Mr. Benjamin in page 547 of the
second edition of his work on Sales, where he lays it down as follows, speaking of "sales on trial," or "sales on approval," in
which cases, he says, "There is no sale until the approval is given
either expressly or by implication, resulting from keeping the
goods beyond the time allowed for trial." Here, I think, there
was no sale at the time of the horse's death, which happened without the fault of either party, and therefore the action for goods sold
and delivered must fail, and I give judgment for the defendant
except so far as relates to the costs of, and occasioned by, the allegations of warranty and unsoundness, which costs I order to be
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paid by the defendant: such costs to be set off against the defendant's costs on taxation.

Judgment for the defendant.
The question in the above arid similar cases is, whether the title passes to
the vendee subject to be returned, or
whether the possession only passes, the
title to pass or not according to future
eircumstances.
Thus, in all contracts of "sale or return," the general construction put upon
them is, that the title passes presently,
subject to an option to return the article within the time fixed, or within a
reasonable time, if none be fixed by the
parties. If, therefore, the buyer fails
to return it within the time stated, or
within a reasonable time, the sale becomes absolute (unless some valid excuse
exists for non-return), and an action for
goods sold and delivered may be maintained, as if the sale had been absolute
in the first instance: Moss v. Sweet, 3
Eng. L. &Eq. 311 ; s. c.16 Q. B.N.S.
495; Holbrook v. Armstrong, 10 Ale.
34; Schlesinger v. Stratton, 9 R. I.
578; Jameson v. Gregory, 4 Mete. (Ky.)
363 ; Johnson v. McLane, 7 Blackf. 501 ;
Quinn v. Stout, 31 Mo. 160; Moore v.
Piercy, I Jones (N. C.) 131; Walker
v. Blake, 37 Me. 375 ; Washington v.
Johnson, 7 Humph. 468.
And ordinarily, in the absence of
anything to the contrary (as to which
see Crocker v. Gullifer, 44 Me. 491),
if the owner of a chattel delivers it to
another, with his promise to return the
same at a stated time or pay a sum of
money therefor, the title passes immediately upon delivery, and the buyer may
immediately sell the same and pass the
property as against the former owner,
even before the time has expired for its
return: Buswell v. Bicknell, 17 Me.
344; Dearborn v. Turner, 16 Id. 17 ;
Pe/kzns v. Douglass, 20 Id. 317 ; McKinneyv. Bradlee, 117 Mass. 321.
On the other hand a transaction may
appear very similar to a sale or return,

in which a directly opposite result
is reached, viz. : where manufamturers,
wholesale dealers, growers of garden
seeds, &c., deliver to retailers large quantities of their goods, with a power of sale,
and an obligation to pay only for what
is sold, and return the balance. In such
cases, it is frequently held that the relation is more that of consignor and consignee, principal and agent, or bailor and
baile, and the title to the whole does
not vest on delivery, in the retailer, so
far, at least, as to be immediately subject
to attachment by his creditors. See Meldrum v. Snow, 9 Pick. 441; Blood v.
Fulmer, 11 Me. 414; Morss v. Stone, 5
Barb. 518.
So in Chamberlain v. Smith, 44 Penn.
St. 431, A., for an agreed sum, delivered B. a yoke of cattle, to keep and
use in a farmer-like manner for one
year and then to be returned, but with
a privilege of keeping them at a price
named, and it was held the contract was
only a bailment and not a conditional
sale, and that the receiver could not sell
the property to even a bondfide buyer.
A very similar case arose in Hunt v.
Wyman, 100 Mass. 198 (1868). The
plaintiff had a horse for sale; the defendant inquired the price and was told
$250. He wanted to buy the horse and
told the plaintiff if he would let him
take the horse and try it, if he did not
like it he would return it in as good
condition as he got it, the same day he
took it. The plaintiff assented, and the
next day delivered the horse to the agent
of the defendant, sent by him for it.
The horse escaped from the servant on
the way to the defendant's stable, ran
away and was severely injured, and the
defendant could not, for that reason,
make any trial, and did not return or
offer to return it, the injury received
making it imprudent to do so. It was

